Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Processing for Email Addresses

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶

This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 February 2024.¶

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS resource record (RR) provides a mechanism for domains to express the allowed set of Certification Authorities (CAs) that are authorized to issue certificates for the domain. [RFC8659] contains the core CAA specification, where Property Tags that restrict the issuance of certificates which certify domain names are defined. [RFC8659] does not define a mechanism to restrict the issuance of certificates which certify email addresses. For the purposes of this document, a certificate "certifies" an email address if the certificate contains the id-kp-emailProtection key purpose in the extendedKeyUsage extension and the email address is included as a rfc822Name or otherName of type id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox in the subjectAltName extension.¶

This document defines a CAA Property Tag which restricts the allowed set of issuers of certificates which certify email addresses. Its syntax and processing are similar to the "issue" Property Tag as defined in section 4.2 of [RFC8659].¶

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

3. Syntax of the "issuemail" Property Tag

This document defines the "issuemail" Property Tag. The presence of one or more "issuemail" Properties in the Relevant Resource Record Set ([RFC8659]) indicates that the domain is requesting that Certification Authorities restrict the issuance of certificates that certify email addresses.¶

The CAA "issuemail" Property Value has the following sub-syntax (specified in ABNF as per [RFC5234]):¶

  issuemail-value = *WSP [issuer-domain-name *WSP]
    [";" *WSP [parameters *WSP]]

  issuer-domain-name = label *("." label)
  label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))

  parameters = (parameter *WSP ";" *WSP parameters) / parameter
  parameter = tag *WSP "=" *WSP value
  tag = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))
  value = *(%x21-3A / %x3C-7E)

The production rules for "WSP", "ALPHA", and "DIGIT" are defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]. Readers who are familiar with the sub-syntax of the "issue" and "issuewild" Property Tags will recognize that this sub-syntax is identical.¶

The meanings of each production rule within "issuemail-value" are as follows:¶

• "issuer-domain-name": A domain name of the CA comprised of one or more labels¶
• "label": A single domain label which consists solely of ASCII letters, digits, and the hyphen (known as an "LDH label")¶
• "parameters": A semicolon-separated list of parameters¶
• "parameter": A tag and a value, separated by an equals sign ("=")¶
• "tag": A keyword which identifies the type of parameter¶
• "value": The string value for a parameter¶

4. Processing of the "issuemail" Property Tag

Prior to issuing a certificate that certifies an email address, the Certification Authority MUST check for publication of a Relevant Resource Record Set (RRSet). The discovery of such a Relevant RRSet MUST be performed using the algorithm specified in section 3 of [RFC8659]. The input domain to the discovery algorithm SHALL be the domain "part" ([RFC5322]) of the email address that is being certified. If the domain "part" of the email address being certified is an Internationalized Domain Name ([RFC5890]) that contains one or more U-Labels, then all U-Labels MUST be converted to their A-Label representation ([RFC5891]) for the purpose of discovering the Relevant RRSet for that email address.¶

If the Relevant RRSet is empty, or the Relevant RRSet does not contain any "issuemail" Properties, then the domain has not requested any restrictions on the issuance of certificates for email addresses. The presence of other Property Tags, such as "issue" or "issuewild", does not restrict the issuance of certificates which certify email addresses.¶

For each "issuemail" Property in the Relevant RRSet, the Certification Authority SHALL compare its issuer-domain-name with the issuer-domain-name as expressed in the Property Value. If there is not any "issuemail" record whose issuer-domain-name (as expressed in the Property Value) matches the Certification Authority's issuer-domain-name, then the Certification Authority MUST NOT issue the certificate. If the Relevant RRSet contains any "issuemail" Property whose issuemail-value does not conform to the ABNF syntax as defined in Section 3 of this document, then those records SHALL be treated as if the issuer-domain-name in the issuemail-value is the empty string.¶

If the certificate certifies more than one email address, then the Certification Authority MUST perform the above procedure for each email address being certified.¶

The assignment of issuer-domain-names to Certification Authorities is beyond the scope of this document.¶

Parameters may be defined by a Certification Authority as a means for domains to further restrict the issuance of certificates. For example, a Certification Authority may define a parameter which contains an account identifier. If the domain elects to add this parameter in an issuemail Property, the Certification Authority will verify that the account that is requesting the certificate matches the account specified in the Property and will refuse to issue the certificate if they do not match.¶

The processing of parameters in the issuemail-value are specific to each Certification Authority and are beyond the scope of this document. In particular, this document does not define any parameters and does not specify any processing rules for when parameters must be acknowledged by a Certification Authority. However, parameters that do not conform to the ABNF syntax as defined in Section 3 will result in the issuemail-value being not conformant with the ABNF syntax. As stated above, a Property whose issuemail-value is malformed SHALL be treated as if the issuer-domain-name in the issuemail-value is the empty string.¶

5. Examples of the "issuemail" Property Tag

Several illustrative examples of Relevant RRSets and their expected processing semantics follow. All examples assume that the issuer-domain-name for the Certification Authority is "authority.example".¶

mail.client.example         CAA 0 issue "authority.example"
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issue "other-authority.example"

mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail ";"

mail.client.example
        CAA 0 issuemail "authority.example; account=123456"

mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail ";"
mail.client.example         CAA 0 issuemail "authority.example"

malformed.client.example     CAA 0 issuemail "%%%%%"

6. Security Considerations

The security considerations that are expressed in [RFC8659] are relevant to this specification.¶

The processing of "issuemail" Properties as specified in this document is a supplement to the Certification Authority's validation process. The Certification Authority MUST NOT treat solely the presence of an "issuemail" Property with its issuer-domain-name specified within the relevant CAA RRSet as sufficient validation of the email address. The Certification Authority MUST validate the email address according to the relevant policy documents and practice statements.¶

CAA Properties may have the "critical" flag asserted, which specifies that the Property is critical and must be processed by conforming Certification Authorities. If a Certification Authority does not understand the Property, then it MUST NOT issue the certificate in question.¶

If a single CAA RRSet is processed by multiple Certification Authorities for the issuance of multiple certificate types, then a Certification Authority's lack of support for a critical CAA Property in the RRSet will prevent the Certification Authority from issuing any certificates for that domain.¶

For example, assume that an RRSet contains the following Properties:¶

client.example         CAA 128 issue "other-authority.example"
client.example         CAA 0 issuemail "authority.example"

In this case, if the Certification Authority whose issuer-domain-name matches "authority.example" does not recognize the "issue" Property Tag, then that Certification Authority will not be able to issue S/MIME certificates that certify email addresses for "client.example".¶

7. IANA Considerations

The author requests the registration of the following "Certification Authority Restriction Properties" in the registry group "Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Parameters":¶

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the participants on the LAMPS Working Group mailing list for their insightful feedback and comments. In particular, the author extends sincere appreciation to Alexey Melnikov, Christer Holmberg, Éric Vyncke, John Levine, Lars Eggert, Michael Richardson, Murray Kucherawy, Paul Wouters, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Roman Danyliw, Russ Housley, Sean Turner, Seo Suchan, Tim Chown, and Tim Wicinski for their official reviews and suggestions which greatly improved the quality of this document.¶

Author's Address